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1. INTRODUCTION
lmost simultaneously at the dawn 
of the ongoing crisis, in 2009 two
operating structures were 
established in France and in UK to support 
their automotive supply chains: the 
Plateforme de la Filière Automobile (PFA) 
and the British Automotive Council (BAC). In 
2013, the Italian government began to 
consider the advisability of establishing a 
similar structure (the Italian Automotive 
Council - IAC) inspired by the French and the 
British cases. 
The PFA and the BAC can be defined as 
two instruments of industrial policy 
introduced in parallel to the classical public 
support allowed by the European Union and 
that in some ways represent a turning point of 
the mode of state intervention in the real 
economy. In many countries, particularly in 
France and UK, a partial transformation of the 
industrial policy framework is in progress: 
from measures mainly horizontal, which could 
affect the overall performance of the economy 
and the competitive framework in which 
companies operate, to measures aimed at to 
affect the performance of various industries or 
sectors of the economy. Government policy 
makers are now of the view that over reliance 
on an essentially horizontal perspective for 
policy design has not proved sufficient on its 
own to secure industrial needs (Coffey and 
Thornley, forthcoming).  
Indeed, in France in one way or another, the 
bilateral approach has been preserved 
especially for the automotive industry (Jullien 
e Pardi, 2013). Accordingly, British industrial 
policy is moving to a system in which an 
existing horizontal framework is 
supplemented by sector-specific packages. 
The general disposition of what British 
policy makers continue to see as a business-
friendly environment will remain unchanged. 
But it is now thought of in terms of a starting 
point rather than a finishing point for policy, 
providing the “bedrock” upon which sector-
specific effects are built via tailored policy 
packages targeting selected industries 
(Department for Business, Innovation and 
Skills, 2012). 
In general terms, also the European Union is 
beginning to be more prone to the policies of 
the vertical type, such as the program CARS 
2020 to promote competitiveness and 
sustainable development, but also other 
industry are concerned with the programs 
LeaderShip 2020 for shipbuilding, Global 
Construction 2020 for building and the Action 
Plan for steel industry. 
This paper is made up of seven sections, in 
addition to this introduction and the 
conclusions. Section 2 reports the effect of the 
crisis on the automotive industry in France, 
UK and Italy and the third second section 
shows an overview of the public support for 
the European automotive granted for ensuring 
the survival o the entire supply chain. In the 
following two sections the main features of 
the PFA and the BAC will be presented and 
section 6 shows the possible implementations 
and amendments for the nascent IAC. 
On the basis of a preliminary evaluation of 
the operating plateforme-council cases 
(section 7), the paper will pay attention in the 
section 8 on the formal and informal 
governance and how to balance the role of the 
different actors under the Triple Helix 
approach. 
Effectively, the PFA and the BAC have two 
headways in common. The first is based on 
the fact that the new industrial policies must 
A 
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come from a strategic and long-lasting 
collaborations between industry and 
government. The second derives from the fact 
that for pervasive sectors such as automotive, 
the involvement of the various levels of 
government must be integral, horizontally and 
vertically, and it requires an authoritative 
coordination to reduce the risk of 
inappropriate interventions. 
2. THE CRISIS AND THE 
AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY IN 
FRANCE, THE UK, AND ITALY 
The three countries analysed in this paper 
display distinctive characteristics in relation to 
current market trends and automotive 
production structure. The positive sales 
figures of the last few years were confirmed at 
the global level in 2013, despite a slight 
slowdown, but the European continent is the 
only area showing a countertrend: Europe -
2.0%, NAFTA countries +7.1%, South 
America +1.5%, and Asia +5.8%. However, 
data on the first few months of 2014 hint at a 
turnaround. 
In the last two years, a drop in sales has 
affected all European countries except the UK 
(+15.4%) and, among the major markets, the 
greatest difficulties are reported in Italy (-
26.9%) and in France (-18.1%). Compared to 
2007, the last year before the beginning of the 
economic downturn, the figures are negative 
across the board, particularly in Italy (-48.9%) 
and to a lesser extent in France (-16.3%), 
where the market has benefited from extended 
support measures, and in the UK (-7.3%). 
The evolution of global production is 
directly linked to sales trends by macroareas, 
which tend to increase worldwide, with South 
America returning to grow considerably in 
2013 (+8.6%) and the NAFTA area 
performing better than in the pre-crisis period 
(+4.3%), while Europe is still experiencing a 
contraction in sales (-0.5%). Among the 
European countries, France stands out for its 
negative performance (-11.6%), while the 
opposite is true for Spain (+9.3%). A 2.0% 
drop is reported in Italy, whereas the UK 
displays a slight increase (+1.3%). Compared 
to 2007, the production of passenger and 
commercial vehicles has fallen by 42.3% in 
France, by 8.7% in the UK, and by 48.8% in 
Italy.Table 1 summarises the situation of the 
automotive sector in the three countries under 
investigation, using Germany as a benchmark 
and in comparison to 2007.  
In particular, the following can be 
highlighted: 
- France, characterised by the presence of 
three carmakers (Peugeot-Citroën, Renault, 
and Toyota), has benefited from scrapping 
incentives resulting in limited losses in 
terms of new vehicle registrations. Yet, 
this has not prevented a drop in production, 
especially in 2013, caused by the policies 
of delocalisation to countries with lower 
labour costs pursued by the national car 
manufacturers; 
- the United Kingdom displays the best 
results for what concerns both new 
registrations and overall production and 
national figures seem to have returned to 
levels approaching those of the pre-crisis 
years. This positive performance is 
partially ascribable to greater attention 
paid to the segments of used cars and 
company fleets, which make up more than 
50% of the market, as well as to the actions 
taken by the British Automotive Council, 
which has intervened in order to safeguard 
some domestic manufacturers. Six large-
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volume carmakers operate in the UK 
(Nissan, Jaguar-Land Rover, BMW-Mini, 
Honda, Toyota, and GM-Vauxall). In 
addition, there are two carmakers also 
producing engines (Ford and BMW), along 
with a number of luxury car manufacturers 
(Aston Martin, Bentley, Lotus, McLaren, 
MG, Morgan, and Rolls-Royce) and 
companies specialising exclusively in the 
production of commercial vehicles; 
- Italy has experienced the most 
considerable decrease in terms of sales and 
production, with trend alignments in the 
last few years. This sharp reduction is 
ascribable to a greater impact of the 
recession, to increases in purchase taxation 
and, above all, to the use of motor vehicles 
at the national level. A key factor 
characterising the Italian market is the low 
ratio between car production and car sales, 
equal to 43.7% in 2012. This figure is 
much lower than in Germany and Spain 
(where production volumes are roughly 
twice as high as new vehicle registrations), 
and in France (with values approaching 
80%). Even in the UK, despite the absence 
of a national carmaker, around two thirds 
of cars sold are produced domestically, 
although this is the result of substantial 
import and export flows. The situation in 
Italy is due to the presence of a single 
large-volume car manufacturer, which has 
progressively rationalised national 
production and has only recently planned 
to start increasing domestic production 
from 2014. 
 
 
Table 1: Sales and production statistics 
Sales index number  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
France 100 99.5 103.4 103.0 102.2 88.7 83.7 
Great Britain 100 88.8 79.4 81.9 80.3 83.4 92.7 
Italy 100 87.2 84.9 77.9 70.0 55.3 51.1 
Germany 100 98.4 116.3 91.8 100.8 97.5 93.6 
Production index number         
France 100 85.2 67.9 73.9 74.4 65.2 57.7 
Great Britain 100 94.2 62.3 79.6 83.6 90.1 91.3 
Italy 100 79.7 65.7 65.3 61.5 52.3 51.2 
Germany 100 97.3 83.8 95.1 101.6 90.9 92.0 
Ratio production/sales 
      
 
France 114.7 98.2 75.3 82.3 83.4 84.4 79.1 
Great Britain 62.5 66.4 49.0 60.7 65.0 67.5 61.5 
Italy 46.2 42.2 35.8 38.7 40.7 43.7 46.4 
Germany 178.4 176.5 128.7 184.7 179.9 166.4 175.5 
Source: OICA 
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It is by no means easy to perform a 
comprehensive comparison among the 
automotive production chains of the three 
countries, since national trade associations 
carry out their surveys using different 
methods depending on how large they 
consider the overall production chain to be. 
For instance, the French Comité des 
Constructeurs Français d’Automobiles 
(CLIFA) refers only to the statistical 
classification corresponding to NACE 29, 
with around 60,000 workers in total in 2012. 
In the United Kingdom, the latest report by 
the Society of Motor Manufacturers and 
Traders (SMMT) identifies the presence of 
around 2,300 firms, employing a total of 
82,000 people, but these data refer to 2009. 
As for Italy, according to the Observatory on 
the Italian Motor Vehicle Supply Chain of the 
Chamber of Commerce of Turin (2013), the 
number of suppliers is similar to the UK 
figures (2,427) but they have more than twice 
as many employees (166,086), while other 
estimates put the total number of suppliers at 
more than 4,000 (Enrietti and Calabrese, 
2013). In comparison to the situation before 
the ongoing crisis, the turnover of the 
automotive supply chain as a whole has 
decreased by 16.9% in France, by in the UK, 
and by 22.8% in Italy. In the last twenty years, 
the supply chain has progressively been 
reorganised on the basis of tiers and this has 
brought to the forefront especially Tier 1 
suppliers, which deal with the production of 
the so-called modules or systems, in 
cooperation and collaboration with a wide 
network of Tier 2 and Tier 3 suppliers 
(Chanaron, 2013). For what concerns Tier 1 
suppliers, Calabrese and Manello (2014) 
highlight marked differences within the 
European context. Despite a limited drop, the 
French supply chain carries greater weight 
and covers the vast majority of supply chain 
nodes (94%), while Italy has a similar number 
of firms but the number of supplies is 
significantly lower (around one third), 
although coverage along the supply chain is 
rather high (76%). Lastly, UK firms display a 
severe lack of skills along the supply chain 
(48%) and their relative weight compared to 
the French suppliers is about one quarter.   
A similar assessment emerges from the list 
of the top 100 global suppliers compiled by 
Automotive News (2013). Among the top 
firms, there are three French automotive 
suppliers (Faurecia, Valeo, and Plastic 
Omnium) but only one firm from Italy 
(Magneti Marelli) and one from the UK 
(GKN). According to this survey, regional 
suppliers will progressively lose ground to 
large suppliers, which will be the only 
manufacturers with enough resources to 
achieve strategic positioning worldwide, make 
major investments in research and 
development, and counter the recession 
cyclically affecting key markets, as currently 
seen in Europe.  
The three supply chains display different 
peculiarities in certain specialised production 
or supply niches, which are not necessarily 
characterised by the exclusive presence of 
small or medium-sized enterprises. For 
example, in France a significant number of 
companies focus on sustainable mobility by 
working above all on electric propulsion 
(Freyssenet, 2011), in the UK there are 
production clusters for racing vehicles and 
motorsport supplies (Coffey and Thornley, 
2013), while Italy has its strength in the 
production of machinery and equipment 
(Rolfo and Vaglio, 2009) and in engineering 
and styling (Calabrese, 2011). 
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3. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PUBLIC 
SUPPORT FOR AUTOMOTIVE 
INDUSTRY 
In periods of crisis vigorous and costly 
intervention has been usually undertaken by 
many governments. In the European Union 
today main public support must tackle the 
reduction of overcapacity and accelerate the 
substitution of the vehicles on the road 
(Calabrese, 2014). The effects of government 
economic interventionism in the automotive 
industry are widely disputed (Wells, 2010). 
The debate fluctuates between distractive 
effect, postponing the restructuring of the 
industry, and the identification of market 
failures to which the car industry is affected. 
This has induced governments to grant the 
largest part of public resources to the lead car 
manufacturers, with the intention of ensuring 
the survival of the entire supply chain 
(Sturgeon and Van Biesebroeck, 2009). 
Grigolon, Leheyda and Verboden (2012) 
have provided a comprehensive overview of 
policies for the European car industry during 
the past decade. They identified nine major 
instruments granted at national level or 
financed through European funds but under 
the control of member state: 
- The General Block Exemption 
Regulation (GBER) applies to cases of low 
intensity aid and it covers numerous types 
of aid, where the intensity is regulated by a 
system of aid ceilings. Automotive 
suppliers rather than carmakers are more 
likely to benefit from these aids that 
generally allow the creation of new 
establishments.  
- Regional aid is the most common 
instrument of state aid used in the car 
industry, especially in the form of 
investment aid to establish new car plants 
or to extend the existing ones in the most 
disadvantaged regions. Over time, regional 
aid has declined. Most regional aid was 
granted in 2001 and 2002. This aid 
instrument was not used extensively during 
the last financial and economic crisis. 
- Training aid is a type of operational aid, 
and is often related to the production of 
new models or the establishment of a new 
plant, which requires new skills and 
qualifications for the workers. It has a 
direct impact on the level of variable cost 
and therefore it can distort the competition 
for the plant located in the concerned 
member state due to carmakers put their 
production plants in competition with one 
another. 
- There are no cases of large individual 
Research and Development and Innovation 
(R&D&I) aid grants to carmakers in the 
last decade. There are several cases of 
R&D&I aid granted in the form of 
schemes targeting car companies, whereas 
individual projects are rather financed by 
the European Investment Bank. The lack 
of big R&D&I cases in the car industry 
may be attributed to the fact that the 
Commission favours approving aid for 
projects to fund radical innovation, while it 
disfavours granting aid for incremental 
innovation and developing new products, 
when R&D gets closer to the market and 
may thus become particularly distortive for 
competition. 
- Rescue aid is a temporary assistance 
provided to a firm at the verge of 
bankruptcy to keep it afloat for the time 
required to develop a restructuring plan. 
In the car industry, there is only one case 
of this aid in favour of MG Rover by the 
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United Kingdom in 2005, on the grounds 
of the limited duration of the measure, and 
the serious social difficulties that the 
immediate bankruptcy of the company 
would have caused (Bentley, Bailey and de 
Ruyter, 2010). The aid was supposed to 
have no negative spillover effects on other 
member states, due to the low market share 
of the company and the limited duration of 
the measure. 
- The Temporary Community framework 
for State aid measures to support access to 
finance during the crisis was adopted at the 
end of 2008. Given the exceptionality of 
the measures, the Framework was limited 
in time and was to expire at the end of 
2010, but was prolonged until the end of 
2011. The Temporary Framework was 
essentially a fast-track to grant R&D&I aid 
and R&R aid during the period of crisis. 
The most common measures were the 
limited amounts of aid, subsidized loan 
guarantees and subsidized loans. Although 
the Temporary Framework was 
implemented through horizontal schemes, 
some member states, namely France and 
Germany, have in practice used it to 
support their automotive sector. The aim of 
Commission’s intervention was to avoid a 
return to protectionism in member states. 
- The EIB has financed the automotive 
sector with regard the three general 
objectives established in the Treaty, that is: 
regional aid, where EIB financing for 
automotive manufacturing is especially 
targeting investments located in 
Convergence regions in the European 
Union; R&D&I aid granted especially on 
safety grounds; R&D&I aid granted on 
environmental grounds to meet the 
emission reduction targets. 
- The European Social Fund (ESF) and the 
European Globalisation Adjustment Fund 
(EGF) are two European programs aimed 
at improving employment opportunities for 
workers and minimizing social costs of 
industry restructuring. Both instruments 
were used during the crisis to mitigate its 
negative social effects in the European car 
industry. In particular, the ESF was used to 
support short-term workers by financing 
training and a part of wage and non-wage 
labour costs; support company and sector 
restructuring; finance retraining and 
anticipate change requirements and match 
skills. Member states also applied for co-
financing of active social protection 
measures from the EGF in order to support 
workers who lost their jobs as a result of 
the economic crisis.  
- In 2009 scrapping schemes have been 
temporary enacted in 13 European Union 
member states, which together represent 
85% of total vehicle sales in this region. 
The primary objective was to provide 
general economic stimulus; the secondary 
was renewal of the European car park and 
benefits for road safety. Scholars and 
practitioners have different opinions on the 
matter. According to IHS Global Insight 
(2010), scrapping schemes have been 
remarkably successful for all three targets 
even if scrapping incentives are seen as a 
measure to modify customer requirements 
and distort the market, leading only to 
limited short-term benefits, due to pull 
forward effects. 
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Table 2:  Quantification of public support for the European car industry (€mil., 2000-2011) 
Public support instrument France Germany Italy Spain UK 
General Block Exception Regulation     3.80  
Regional aid  11.60 702.96 386.67 580.82 253.04 
Training aid  1.25 0.45 76.94  37.09 
R&D&I aid   47.70    
Rescue & Restructuring aid      6.50 
Temporary Framework  900.00 225.00     
EIB support  1,660.00 5,090.00 650.00 500.00 3,104.00 
Social public support (ESF & EGF) 37.70   4.30  
Scrapping schemes  605.00 3,924.21 1,000.00 264.00 443.94 
Source: Grigolon, Leheyda and Verboden (2012) 
Table 2 shows these instruments by the 
main European automotive countries and 
reports state aid support as gross grant 
equivalent in present value, whereas EIB 
loans, EGF support and scrapping schemes 
are expressed in nominal value. For this 
reason the columns’ sum is not possible to 
calculate. France and Germany were the more 
active countries and granted six instruments. 
Regional aid, EIB loans and scrappage 
scheme were used by all the five countries. 
4. THE PLATEFORME DE LA FILIÈRE 
AUTOMOBILE 
The Plateforme de la Filière Automobile 
(PFA) was established immediately after the 
beginning of the current economic-financial 
crisis. Through the Ministry for the Economy, 
Finance, and Industry, the Sarkozy 
government called a round table (“Etats 
Généraux de l'Automobile“) which saw the 
participation of all the main actors of the 
French automotive supply chain.  
This led the various social partners and  
 
stakeholders to sign a Code of Conduct with 
the purpose of improving relations between 
clients and suppliers along the supply chain. 
Besides laying down some rules concerning 
contractual frameworks, intellectual property, 
and business terms in client-supplier 
transactions, the Code of Conduct also 
envisaged the creation of a permanent 
platform for consultation and exchange 
between clients and suppliers within the 
automotive supply chain.  
The PFA was set up in April 2009 and – like 
similar initiatives directly targeting the 
suppliers, such as the FMEA (Fonds de 
Modernisation des Equipementiers 
Automobiles) – it seeks to “contribute to 
defining, coordinating, and promoting actions 
needed to improve the competitiveness of and 
strengthen the French automotive supply 
chain”.  
In practical terms, its aim is to readjust the 
balance of power between carmakers and 
suppliers in order to achieve greater supply 
chain solidarity, as stated in the Code of 
Conduct.  
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The Statute of the PFA lists as its 
objectives: 
- Supporting economic development and 
change in the French automotive supply 
chain and increasing its professional skills; 
- Promoting the sharing of a common 
strategic vision in the medium to long term 
across all levels of the automotive supply 
chain – final assemblers, Tier 1 suppliers, 
and sub-suppliers – for what concerns 
industrial and technological choices, the 
creation of skill-development hubs, and 
stronger orientation towards the 
international markets; 
- Developing methodologies within the 
supply chain able to ensure worldwide 
excellence;  
- Identifying strategic innovations based 
on professional skill and/or technological 
specialisation and developing strategies for 
competitive improvement; 
- Promoting, implementing, and checking 
compliance with all the provisions 
included in the Code of Conduct;  
- Encouraging dialogue across the whole 
automotive supply chain. 
The PFA was set up by the government, but 
it is jointly led and financed by carmakers 
(Renault, Renault Trucks, and PSA) and by 
the suppliers’ association (CLIFA). Therefore, 
it is a hybrid initiative combining industrial 
policy elements (national solidarity, public 
support to the supply chain, direct actions to 
save struggling firms) and the traditional 
objectives and methods used by carmakers to 
manage and secure supplies (consolidation 
and rationalisation of the supply chain through 
cost cutting, investment planning, and 
mergers and acquisitions).  
The positions of President and Vice-
president have systematically been given to 
the representatives of Tier 1 suppliers or of 
their professional trade associations, while the 
position of Director General has always been 
held by a representative of the assemblers. 
The French government is represented only by 
a member of the Comité Industriel Ministère 
and by an observer from the DGCIS 
(Direction générale de la compétitivité, de 
l'industrie et des services) of the Ministry of 
Industry.  
Since July 2009, the intervention measures 
of the PFA have been organised around four 
workgroups. This level too is mostly 
characterised by the presence of industrial 
representatives, while government figures 
may or may not be present. 
- The first group works to support the 
spreading of Lean Manufacturing along the 
supply chain (300 suppliers identified as 
main priority); 
- The second group focuses on future skills 
and knowledge, and its objective is to 
promote the supply chain to attract high-
level personnel and develop said skills and 
knowledge; 
- The third group concentrates on the 
management of information and 
communication along the supply chain, 
paying specific attention to the role of new 
information and communication 
technologies; 
- The fourth group is tasked with 
elaborating a common strategy in the 
medium and long term in order to improve 
the competitive performance of the supply 
chain. In the medium term, the priority is 
to identify main development opportunities 
to reduce excess production capacity and 
make the supply chain more competitive. 
In the long term, the aim is to devise 
methods to move towards clean engines 
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and anticipate the features and functions of 
the vehicles of the “future”.  
In July 2012 the Hollande government 
relaunched the “plan automobile”, in 
particular for what concerns public support to 
the development of sustainable mobility. 
Moreover, the key role of the PFA in 
managing the supply chain was once again 
emphasised in relation to research and 
development guidelines as well as support to 
and development of suppliers, still following 
the leading principle of national solidarity. 
As can be seen, the change in political 
affiliation of the French government did not 
modify the key objective of the PFA, which 
was not only to respond to the crisis, 
particularly severe in the automotive sector, 
but also to demand that carmakers change 
their strategies and trajectories aimed at 
delocalising production to countries with low 
labour costs, which had prevailed in the 2004-
2008 period. 
5. THE BRITISH AUTOMOTIVE 
COUNCIL 
The British Automotive Council (BAC) is a 
joint industry-government deliberative body. 
It was established in December 2009 by the 
Labour party government to introduce greater 
certainty into automotive industry planning 
while identifying opportunities for 
development. Support for the BAC and 
promotion of its role has continued under the 
subsequent Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat Coalition government. Continuity 
rather than change can therefore be expected.  
The BAC has since assumed a key place in 
government policy thinking and policy 
delivery. It has taken forward a ‘road-map’ for 
the industry with respect to a move towards 
low carbon auto-mobility. Its two main 
working sub-groups deal with the supply 
chain (Supply Group) and automotive 
technologies (Technology Group). It has 
played a significant role in the design of a 
new British automotive strategy, drawing 
together a series of policy themes organized 
around the twin planks of sustainability and 
inward investment. 
The BAC followed the recommendations of 
a report produced that same year by the New 
Automotive Innovation and Growth Team 
(NAIGT), an industry-led policy review team 
sponsored by the then Minister for Business at 
the Department for Business Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform (BERR).  This report 
concluded a one year project, launched in 
April 2008, to identify a 20 year 
developmental vision for the automotive 
sector. 
Establishing a permanent and joint industry-
government Automotive Council was the 
principal recommendation of the NAIGT 
report, which argued that it should be tasked 
with developing, guiding and implementing a 
‘strategic framework’ for the industry. The 
continuities between the NAIGT’s own 
overview and the BAC’s subsequent 
perspective on the difficulties and 
opportunities facing the industry are also quite 
considerable. 
It was envisaged that the new body would 
work to make the UK a comparatively 
attractive business environment for 
international automotive industry investment, 
including encouraging policies to strengthen 
the UK automotive industry supply base. In 
this last respect, improving skills provision 
and enhancing collaborative scale in research 
and development, components, and facilities 
were identified as key goals. It was also 
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proposed that the BAC should take on a 
leadership role in driving forward new low 
carbon vehicle technologies and fuels, helping 
Britain take advantage of commercial 
opportunities to make it a centre of 
technology development in these as in other 
fields. 
The BAC is Co-Chaired by a Government 
Chair and an Industry Chair. The first position 
is currently occupied by the Secretary of 
State, or Minister, for the Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills. The fact that 
a Cabinet level member of the UK 
government sits at the apex of the BAC 
signals both the degree of political support 
which it enjoys and its positioning as a body 
of influence in a complex industrial area 
involving multiple parties both inside and 
outside of government. 
As well as the Co-Chairs and CEO, there 
are currently 24 other BAC members. 
Business members on the BAC account for 22 
positions. These include representatives of all 
the major car groups operating in the UK, as 
well as specialist car makers. Original 
Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) in trucks 
and other automotive products are also 
represented, as are major component groups, 
and professional services. One bank also 
supplies a BAC member.  
There is one representative from a trade 
union, Unite. and there is a representative too 
for Britain’s main relevant research funding 
agency, the Engineering and Physical 
Sciences Research Council (EPSRC). It 
disburses state-grants to university 
engineering and science projects, favouring 
collaborative projects. 
The objectives which were established for 
the BAC are: 
- Create a transformed business 
environment for the automotive industry in 
the UK to provide a more compelling 
investment proposition for related 
industries; 
- Develop further the technology roadmaps 
for low carbon vehicles and fuels, and 
exploit opportunities to promote the UK as 
a strong candidate to develop these and 
other technologies; 
- Develop a stronger and more competitive 
automotive supply chain; 
- Provide a stronger public voice for the 
industry to support the value of the 
industry to the UK and to global partners;  
- Ensure a strategic, continuous 
conversation between Government and the 
automotive industry in the UK. 
The central position of the Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills is strategic in 
the relationship between the BAC and the 
government. 
Another key government unit is the Office 
for Low Emission Vehicles (OLEV), which is 
based within the Department for Transport 
(DfT). This Office has responsibility for low 
or ultra-low carbon vehicle technologies, and 
works closely with the Technology Strategy 
Board (TSB), a ‘business-led’ government 
innovation agency that supports businesses 
and plays a key role in directing competitive 
funding towards innovative projects.  
A fourth main partner on the government 
side is UK Trade and Investment (UKTI), 
which provides support and advice for 
businesses based in Britain and operating in 
international markets. 
The BAC engages multiple stake-holders 
while drawing on previously existing 
institutional relationships including the 
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industry’s main trade association in Britain – 
the Society of Motor Manufacturers and 
Traders (SMMT). 
The BAC has been responsible for taking 
forward an industry ‘road map’ for the 
transition to low carbon auto-mobility and 
sustainability, while its two working 
subgroups deliver policy relevant studies and 
reports. 
The Technology Group inherited the 
technology road map compiled by NAIGT 
and has organised its activities via five main 
working units: Technology road maps and test 
bed UK; Low carbon vehicle infrastructure 
development; OEM and supplier research and 
development (R&D) inward investment; 
Funding and Academic Partnerships; 
Intelligent Transport Systems Development. 
In addition to liaising closely with the 
Technology Group, the Supply Group 
approach is to work on a communication plan 
linking suppliers to sourcing opportunities, 
while keeping them apprised of its own 
activities. These include: sourcing roadmap, 
setting out sourcing priorities for Tier 1 
products as well as equipment; promoting and 
seeking support for existing suppliers through 
Tiers 1, 2 and 3; investigating transition 
capabilities and readiness for the move to low 
carbon automobility; and after identifying 
gaps in preparedness, assisting the industry to 
formulate proposals vis-à-vis government. 
Finally, the BAC has helped launch a new 
British automotive strategy, albeit one which 
is in line with previously existing policy 
themes for automotive industry and it enjoys 
stable political support and a substantial cross-
party political consensus exists for the broad 
thrust of current policy trajectories – it is now 
viewed by senior British government policy 
makers as a ‘flagship partnership’ with 
industry. It is advertised within Britain as an 
example to be followed by other industrial 
sectors as part of a major current reorientation 
of British industrial policy – moving from 
sole reliance on horizontal policy measures 
towards sector-specific targeting. 
6. TOWARDS AN ITALIAN 
AUTOMOTIVE COUNCIL 
In 2013, the Italian government began to 
consider the advisability of establishing a 
structure (the Italian Automotive Council - 
IAC) resembling the PFA and the BAC. 
In their recent history, France and the 
United Kingdom have not experienced broad 
government coalitions, which has instead been 
the case in Germany in the past few years and 
in Italy since 2011. Nevertheless, as 
highlighted in the above sections, different 
political parties seem to have a common and 
enduring vision regarding the policies aimed 
at the automotive sector. A similar situation 
occurred in the United States where, at the 
end of his mandate in 2008 and despite his 
aversion to rescuing enterprises through 
public financing, President Bush approved a 
17.4 billion dollar bailout for General Motors 
and Chrysler, demanding in return the 
definition of restructuring plans to be 
implemented during the Obama 
administration.  
The Italian situation is radically different 
and, in a sense, the IAC might represent the 
first crucial step towards implementing 
industrial policies expressly based on a 
bottom-up approach. It will be indispensable 
for all the actors to contribute, both those 
involved directly, such as employers’ 
associations and various government levels, 
and those involved indirectly, such as 
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consumer associations and the university. 
Effective policies for the automotive sector 
are becoming increasingly important at 
present, since the FIAT-Chrysler alliance is 
turning into a single enterprise, with global 
development plans which might concern Italy 
only if the national economic system and, in 
particular, the automotive system succeed in 
becoming competitive. 
Automotive policies ought to be 
characterised by a precise industrial strategy 
capable, on the one hand, of highlighting the 
points of excellence of the supply chain –
specifically in relation to engine design, high-
end and niche production, engineering 
services, and concept design – and, on the 
other hand, of attracting financial capital and 
new investments, while also addressing the 
credit system and local autonomy. 
As shown by the cases of the PFA and the 
BAC, the way in which the various actors 
operating in the automotive sector are 
involved in the Council is paramount in order 
to ensure its success. 
As already emphasised above, the two 
organisations share two common factors: 
- “new” policies for the sector must stem 
from the strategic and enduring 
collaboration between firms and the 
government; 
- involving the various actors requires 
strong coordination in order to reduce the 
risk of inappropriate actions. 
The number of actors to involve depends on 
the types of objectives outlined. If the ultimate 
goal is solely to strengthen the supply chain, 
the actors involved in the Council can be, as 
in the French case, the Government and the 
trade associations, supported by regional 
organisations promoted by the Chambers of 
Commerce (ARIA). In the United Kingdom, 
the BAC also monitors technological 
development, thus involving a greater number 
of actors. As for Italy, in view of the 
numerous issues concerning the organisational 
structure of the market and the need to 
rebalance taxation, the involvement of several 
actors called upon to deal with specific topics 
should be envisaged. 
A crucial aspect concerns the involvement 
of representatives from different government 
levels, in particular the Central Government. 
In the PFA and, to a greater extent, in the 
BAC, government representation is 
substantial and heavily structured. In Italy, 
various government subjects have an interest 
in the automotive sector for a wide range of 
reasons. It will undoubtedly be necessary to 
find a common approach to be adopted by all 
the ministries to achieve coordination with 
government agencies and subsidiaries in order 
to interact with one, unambiguous voice with 
the entrepreneurial and local counterparties. 
Generally speaking, the PFA and the BAC 
have been tasked with pursuing very similar 
objectives, i.e. strengthening the supply chain 
and identifying a feasible course of action to 
achieve sustainable mobility. 
In France, the issues regarding the 
development of eco-friendly vehicles are 
actually addressed through a specific national 
plan and they are sub-objectives of the PFA’s 
strategy to develop the supply chain. In fact, 
the PFA was essentially established by state 
intervention in order to create local champions 
for each individual sector, clustered around a 
Tier 1 supplier.  
Conversely, the BAC was established with 
the more generic purpose of providing a 
favourable environment for business planning 
and better communication with the 
government, besides identifying opportunities 
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for the commercial development of 
sustainable technologies and for internal 
investments. 
In addition, the case of Italy requires a 
thorough assessment of market dynamics, 
which are affected by a series of factors such 
as: rules and regulations on business and 
taxation, the reorganisation of the distribution 
network, relations between sales of new and 
used cars, and the breakdown of the clientele 
between private and commercial customers. 
7. PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF 
THE PLATEFORME-COUNCIL CASES 
Since they have now been operating for four 
years, it is possible to perform an initial 
assessment of the PFA and the BAC, which 
undoubtedly represent a starting point for the 
forthcoming establishment of the IAC in Italy.  
The emulation of these operating structures 
in Italy must carefully distinguish between 
their nationally specific contexts and features, 
in particular the role of dominant industry 
players and the prior evolution of consultative 
industry mechanisms and institutions, and 
their usefully replicable ambitions and 
functions as deliberative bodies advising and 
directing policy.  
Regarding the strengths of the PFA, it is 
important to draw attention, first of all, to its 
hybrid model of governance, which has made 
it possible to integrate the French carmakers 
and the main Tier 1 suppliers directly into the 
organisation, thus avoiding any form of 
institutional blockage by the industrial actors 
and, as a consequence, supporting the 
development of policies focusing on the 
sector’s best interests.  
Secondly, the integration of local bodies 
promoted by the Chambers of Commerce 
(ARIA - Associations Régionales des 
Industriels de l’Automobile) has ensured 
territorial representation and, at least partially, 
contributed to protect the interests of Tier 2 
suppliers.  
As for the weaknesses of the PFA, it clearly 
emerges that, after having exhausted its initial 
drive triggered by the economic crisis and by 
pressure from the government, the French 
organisation has slowly ground to a halt.  
Generally speaking, the evident slowdown 
in the activities of the PFA workgroups in 
2010 and 2011 mirrors the partial recovery 
experienced by the automotive market during 
that period. Once the immediate urgency of 
the situation was over, both carmakers and 
Tier 1 suppliers started to desert the 
workgroups. The workgroups which managed 
to continue operating did so only because 
their sub-supply chains were already 
organised before the crisis and, thus, they 
succeeded in benefiting from the institutions 
of the PFA in order to consolidate their action. 
As for the other groups, the voluntary basis on 
which the PFA was set up was not enough to 
catalyse and consolidate the work begun in 
2009. The more positive economic situation in 
2010, and even more in 2011, quickly caused 
the PFA to fall into an evident state of 
lethargy. 
When the crisis re-emerged in more recent 
years (2012-2013), the situation appeared 
once again to be particularly difficult and, in 
some cases, even desperate. Furthermore, the 
strategies pursued by PSA and Renault – 
whose boards of directors have continued to 
insist on the lack of competitiveness of the 
national supply chain in order to defend the 
choice of delocalising production to countries 
with lower labour costs – have pushed the 
PFA into a gridlock, essentially confirming 
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the limits of such an organisation in 
implementing profitable industrial policies. 
On the one hand, the PFA has proven to be 
an extremely effective tool to intervene 
rapidly and in a way that matches the common 
interests of the carmakers and of the main Tier 
1 suppliers, for instance to promote the 
adoption of lean manufacturing by Tier 2 
suppliers (Workgroup 1 of the PFA) or to 
assist and consolidate the position of 
struggling strategic suppliers through the 
Fonds de Modernisation des Equipementiers 
Automobiles (FMEA). On the other hand, it 
has been extremely hard for the PFA to pursue 
the long-term objectives indicated as the key 
priorities of Workgroup 4, which should have 
led, in practice, to the modernisation and 
strengthening of the supply chain.  
Without a doubt, the main issue is linked to 
the fact that steering and implementing 
industrial policies targeting the supply chain is 
a task which cannot be entirely delegated to 
the actors of the supply chain itself, especially 
when its core actors are largely responsible 
for weakening it. The potential of the tools 
available to the PFA has been greatly reduced 
by several factors such as: insufficient 
presence of the government and of its 
representatives within the PFA’s governance 
structure, lack of direct coordination between 
industrial policy objectives and the tools of 
the PFA, the power of veto granted to the 
carmakers in relation to various strategic 
matters, and, crucially, the inability of the 
government to develop suitable skills to assess 
and steer the activities of the PFA on a more 
normative and less voluntary basis.  
Therefore, the PFA is an innovative and, at 
times, effective tool to manage the crisis of 
the French automotive sector and to 
encourage common and shared reflection on 
the state of the supply chain and on the 
measures to be taken in order to ensure its 
survival. However, in the absence of 
institutionalised and organised integration 
with (national and regional) industrial 
policies, this tool runs the risk of being used 
very little or badly, above all when the issue at 
hand is the definition of common interests 
going beyond company-specific strategies and 
the protection of individual interests. 
As a result, the key problem remains the 
rebalancing of the power relation between car 
manufacturers and suppliers, which could be 
achieved only through more direct 
government intervention. By way of example, 
it would probably be appropriate to establish 
independent institutions for carmakers and 
large Tier 1 suppliers, in order to steer and 
support the consolidation and development 
strategies of Tier 2 suppliers and promote the 
adoption of the Code of Conduct through an 
independent system of supervision, with 
exemplary penalties for the enterprises which 
do not comply with it.  
Until such measures are put in place, the 
economic situation and the performance of the 
markets are likely to intermittently “turn on” 
and “turn off” the actions of the PFA, which 
will therefore work in a reactive rather than 
proactive way. This mode of operation will 
undoubtedly make it possible to manage the 
decline of the supply chain, so as to meet most 
of the (short-term) needs of carmakers, but it 
will hardly be able to promote the “change” 
and “modernisation” hoped for by the 
government for the purpose of curbing the 
still ongoing delocalisation of the supply 
chain. 
The BAC is a joint industry-government 
deliberative body to provide a more certain 
environment for business planning and 
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improved communications with government 
while identifying opportunities for 
commercial development vis-à-vis sustainable 
technologies and inward investment. The 
BAC has been responsible for taking forward 
an industry road map for the transition to low 
carbon auto-mobility and sustainability. 
The difficulties that the BAC is called to 
deal with are not linked to the low 
participation of industrial partners or to the 
lack of government support or political, but 
rather to do with the weaknesses of the current 
structure of the sector, including the entire 
supply chain. 
A full assessment of the role played by the 
BAC also requires understanding of the 
broader trajectories of British industrial 
policy. 
Britain is currently in the process of 
reorienting its general stance on industrial 
policy, because of concerns that its shrunken 
manufacturing base has unbalanced the 
economy. It is moving from reliance upon 
what are usually called horizontal policy 
measures, in which policies are intended to 
apply equally across all industrial sectors, to 
an approach also incorporating sector-specific 
policy measures targeting pre-selected 
industries. In this connection, the BAC is seen 
as a model institution to be emulated and 
benefit of a stable policy environment for the 
automotive industry.  
The BAC is intendedly industry-led with a 
strong government presence. However, while 
giving voice to workers due to the presence of 
a union representation, neither consumer 
groups nor environmental groups are 
incorporated into the body of the BAC, an 
absence that may become more significant 
over time given the degree of change expected 
in the industry over coming decades with the 
transition towards low carbon forms of 
automobility. 
Moreover, the BAC itself has now 
recognised that its own membership is drawn 
from a section of the sector that is less likely 
to encounter the problems facing small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in areas 
such as recruitment, training, and retention of 
workers.  
Similarly, on the policy design front, 
although over the longer term the technology 
roadmaps for the future do envisage a possible 
reorganisation in fundamental ways of 
markets for automobility and related services, 
this is not yet considered an important enough 
dimension of change to merit a dedicated 
working group. This again may prove to be an 
oversight, especially if existing market 
structures impede change. 
8. A TRIPLE HELIX FOR THE 
AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY  
IN EUROPE 
As reported in the previous section, the 
critical feature of an operating structure (such 
as the PFA and the BAC) in supporting an 
industrial sector is its relative formal and 
informal governance. 
As a matter of fact, the PFA and the BAC 
follow the Triple Helix model, but the role of 
the university as a promoter of innovation in a 
knowledge-based society – and the 
automotive sector is a good example of this – 
turns out to be marginal when compared to the 
role of the industry and of the government. 
Nevertheless, the other two fundamental 
elements of the Triple Helix remain valid and, 
from a neo-institutionalist perspective, this 
implies increased collaboration among 
institutions – so that innovation and industrial 
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policies are the result of stronger interactions 
among the actors rather than mere regulations 
imposed by the government – as well as the 
taking on of shared roles that integrate and 
strengthen the way in which the traditional 
functions of the various actors are performed. 
In addition to acknowledging the reduced 
role of the university, the neo-institutionalist 
perspective distinguishes between three main 
configurations in the positioning of the 
university, industry and government 
institutional spheres relative to each other 
(Etzkowitz e Leydesdorff, 2000): 
- a statist configuration, where government 
plays the lead role, driving academia and 
industry, but also limiting their capacity to 
initiate and develop innovative 
transformations; 
- a laissez-faire configuration, 
characterised by a limited state 
intervention in the economy, with industry 
as the driving force and the other two 
spheres acting as ancillary support 
structures and having limited roles in 
innovation: university acting mainly as a 
provider of skilled human capital, and 
government mainly as a regulator of social 
and economic mechanisms;  
- a balanced configuration, specific to the 
transition to a knowledge society, where 
university and other knowledge institutions 
act in partnership with industry and 
government and even take the lead in joint 
initiatives.  
For instance, the PFA might be defined on 
the basis of the liberist framework, since it 
stems from a government initiative but is 
jointly led and financed exclusively by French 
carmakers (Renault, Renault Trucks, and 
PSA) – as Toyota was not taken into account 
– and by the suppliers’ association (CLIFA). 
Therefore, the PFA is a hybrid tool combining 
industrial policy elements with the traditional 
objectives and methods used by carmakers to 
manage and secure supplies. The 
organisational chart of the PFA is formally 
structured so as to ensure equal representation 
of all the actors but, in practice, Tier 2 
suppliers are completely excluded. 
The informal governance of the PFA 
highlights an incomplete view of the sector, 
which almost exclusively mirrors the 
standpoint of the French carmakers and of 
their main suppliers. The weak presence of the 
government is clearly detectable in the 
structure of the PFA. The French government 
did actually provide the PFA with a set of 
rules and institutions, such as the Code of 
Conduct and the participative nature of the 
sub-supply chain workgroups, but it has then 
left its entire management to the major actors 
of the supply chain. 
Conversely, the BAC might be seen as a 
good example of balanced organisation, even 
though it shares its premises with the UK 
association of manufacturers and traders 
(SMMT). The BAC is intendedly industry-led 
but government presence is significant at all 
levels of its operating structure and not only in 
its managing committee, as seen instead in the 
PFA. Indeed, for what concerns the 
reorientation of national policy, the BAC has 
played a crucial role, has been hailed as one of 
the best examples of industry-government 
collaboration, and has implemented a series of 
practices from which other sectors can learn 
much. 
For example, in July 2013 the Department 
for Business, Innovation and Skills, in 
collaboration with the automotive industry via 
the BAC, produced a new British Automotive 
Strategy. The involvement of the industry in 
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helping produce these documents nicely 
illustrates the deliberative function of the 
BAC and the role it is now actively playing in 
policy formulation. A frequent example given 
to illustrate this is that a dialogue between the 
government and General Motors helped it 
decide to build its next generation Astra at the 
Vauxhall Ellesmere Port site rather than in 
Germany, thus securing production, jobs and 
investment. 
As confirmed by key assessments regarding 
the application of the Triple Helix 
(Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz, 1996), the best 
results are achieved thanks to a balanced 
setup, like that of the BAC. This is the frame 
of reference to which the forthcoming IAC 
should refer, possibly with stronger 
integration of the third helix, i.e. greater 
participation by the whole Italian research 
system, which is lacking in the PFA and 
underutilised in the BAC. During the initial 
phase of the IAC, the university could be 
tasked with a role similar to that of mirror 
groups, i.e. consulting and evaluating how 
target objectives can be achieved. In 
particular, the university should certainly be 
involved in identifying technological and 
training programmes with strong innovative 
content, which might also be run alongside 
traditional university courses. 
In any case, as seen for the PFA and the 
BAC, the operating structure of such an 
organisation must necessarily be stable and 
long-lasting, while also being provided with 
steering power and a set of specific 
responsibilities. It follows that honours and 
obligations must go hand in hand in order to 
avoid a situation in which, once the initial 
enthusiasm subsides or the urgency of the 
crisis is over, the various actors lose interest 
in the changes to be pursued. 
9. CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of the Plateforme de la Filière 
Automobile and of the Britain Automotive 
Council is a deliberative one, combined with 
research and policy recommendations 
undertaken by the main working subgroups, 
dealing mainly with technology and supply 
chains. This means that in addition to industry 
government partnership, the two structures 
benefit from significant empirical insights and 
support based on the activities of working 
groups that draw directly on expertise from 
businesses as well as government officials.  
The paper explains the history of the two 
operating structures, the organisation both of 
it and its subgroups, and the changing 
contours of industrial policy which 
contextualise its actions. Likewise, in 2013, 
the Italian government began to consider the 
advisability of establishing a similar structure 
inspired by the French and the British cases. 
The paper shows the possible 
implementations and amendments. 
In describing an operating structure to 
support the automotive industry a distinction 
can be made between goals and policies that 
are generalizable and replicable, and goals 
and policies that are of interest as an insight 
into specific problems and responses but 
which do not necessarily translate into being 
directly applicable to other national contexts. 
It is necessary therefore to draw a distinction 
between the principles entailed in organising a 
similar structure, and the value of its central 
mission in driving forward new technologies 
as a means of pursuing twin objectives of 
sustainability and commercial advantages, and 
the particular obstacles and difficulties faced 
in delivering these given extant national 
supply chain capabilities. 
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But in the last place, the main question is 
how the role of the different actors involved in 
these structures is balanced. 
The main risk is linked to the fact that the 
orientation and implementation of an 
industrial policy for the automotive supply 
chain may not be completely delegated on the 
companies, in particular when its dominant 
players could be largely responsible for its 
weakening. The inadequate presence of the 
government and its representatives in the 
structure of governance, the lack of a direct 
coordination between industrial policy 
objectives and tools, the right of veto left to 
the carmakers and, more fundamentally, the 
inability of the government to develop the 
required skills is likely to reduce the potential 
of these operating structures. 
For this reason, also in the automotive 
industry the balanced configuration of the 
Triple Helix offers the most important insights 
for the development of a sector, as the most 
favourable environments for innovation are 
created at the intersections of the actors. 
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